

THOUGHTS

ON THE

PRESENT WAR,

AND

FUTURE PEACE;

WHEREIN

Our present Measures and Alliances, are
candidly considered.

By a COUNTRY GENTLEMAN.

Quò, quò Scelesti ruitis? ———

*—— Parumne campis atque Neptuno super
Fusum est Latini Sanguinis?*

HOR.

L O N D O N :

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M.DCC.LX.

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Our present Measures and Alliances, are
carefully considered,

By JOHN GUTHRIE

HON.

LONDON:

Printed for M. Cooper in Strand, near
St. Martin's Church.

MDCCLXIII.

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REFLECTIONS

ON THE

PRESENT WAR, &c.

* * * * * NOTHING is more true, nor
 * * * * * N * * * more easily proved by innume-
 * * * * * rable Examples, than that Pre-
 judice has at all Times, like a false Mir-
 rour, inverted, magnified or extenuated
 at Pleasure, Objects and Facts, which at
 other Times, when uninfluenced by that
 magick Passion, would glare upon us in
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their native Colours. Every one is desirous of excepting himself, but there is not one amongst us, who could not readily point out many Instances of this amongst his Friends and Acquaintance, whose Reason he has seen betrayed by this deluding Passion. Extending our Views from private to publick Scenes, we shall find whole Nations; at other Times remarkable for Candour and Justice, under the same baneful Influence; a Distemper the more difficult to root out, as almost the very first Symptoms of it stop our Ears, to every Argument that might undeceive us. The Feaver must be past its Height before any Remedies will take effect: Perhaps there never was a Period in our History, wherein an impartial Observer would point out so many, and such strong Instances of national Prejudices so long kept up,

up, as have prevailed amongst us since the Commencement of the present War. Our natural Sincerity makes us perhaps more liable to this Delirium than any other Nation : A Minister may for a Time be allowed to fan the Fire, which is often necessary to him, even beyond its just Bounds ; but the same Hand which kindles the Flame, should likewise, when the chief Object is attained, at a proper Time restrain its Ardour. At all Times the Man of Candour cannot, methinks, without Regret, see his Country-men accused with too great Reason, of lavishing without Distinction, the most injurious and opprobrious Language on every Action of our Enemy's Conduct, whilst they shamelessly extol the very same or worse in their ally : while he approves the Alliance with *Prussia*, he will not think it necessary to

take Part in what may be blameable, in what may be unjustifiable in our Ally. To praise or dispraise with Justice, we should first consider in what Light we should view the same Actions in our enemies ; and where it is probable our Friendships and Enmities may in Time be changed, it is still more incumbent on us, if we would avoid the Reproach of Levity and inconsiderate Passion,

ACCIDENTAL Circumstances have made *Prussia* our Ally ; those removed, our Interest will stand as before : Great Conquests by *Prussia* could alone confirm it on a lasting Footing ; at present it is evident to impartial Reflection, that however surprizing, however glorious for the King of *Prussia* his Victories have been ; however great he has shewn himself in extri-

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cating himself almost beyond Belief, out of Difficulties in which some Checks, and even Defeats, have involved him; it is yet evident, I say, that though he should remain in Possession of *Silesia*, he must still be at the End of the War more exhausted than his Antagonist. The extorted Assistance of *Saxony* excepted, his Subjects have alone been obliged to oppose, on all Sides, the confederate Armies of the *Empire*, *Austria*, *Sweden*, and of *France*, for a Time: Their joint Losses have probably been much greater than his, but he must have lost infinitely more Men than any one of them taken separately: His Dominions composed chiefly of countries deprived of commercial Advantages, and whose Soil is naturally ingrate, will, in consequence of this Depopulation, remain many Years in a State of

Languor

Languor and Weakness; and like *Sweden*, after having made Efforts for some Time, far beyond its natural Strength, sink again into a petty State. His Enemy's Territories, more rich and fruitful, will much sooner recover the Losses sustained in this inveterate War: In a few Years the old Jealousies between *France* and *Austria* will probably be revived; and as *Prussia's* only Hopes and Fears must arise from the *Austrian* Power, he must and will undoubtedly again throw himself into the Arms of *France*, his old and natural Ally. Whenever this happens (as no doubt it will in the Course of not many Years), it is to be wished for the Honour of this Nation, that we be not as ready to blacken even beyond Reason those very Actions, as we now are to extol them, without

without much Regard to their Consistency with Justice or Humanity.

How differently will subsided Animosities and Peace present that Monarch to our View ? The great, the good, the magnanimous, the Protestant King of *Prussia*, will then want Something more decisive to support such high Pretensions. As well as his own Subjects we shall begin to find we have purchased his Glories at too high a Price : But when we see him again united to our Enemy, will he be exempt from a like Reverse in our Opinions, as the Queen of *Hungary* has been subject to. Even his most sanguine Admirers would then perhaps see in a different Light, as well his past Conduct, as what would then occur to their Censure. They would then perhaps begin to surmise,

mise, that that Prince's Zeal for the Protestant Cause, (if however it be true that he ever pretended it) was at least subservient to his Ambition, if not merely a Cloak to it. They would then perchance reflect that a Prince, who after the most solemn Treaties, was not ashamed to break through the Tyes of Oaths and Promises, not once, but twice, within the Space of four Years, is not entitled to implicit Belief, when he asserts upon presumptive Evidence only (for the Papers found at *Dresden* prove no more than a defensive Alliance) that the blackest Conspiracy was formed to strip him of his Dominions by his enterprizing Neighbours, whom Facts plainly shewed not even sufficiently prepared to defend themselves. Facts considered coolly will then perhaps appear such stubborn Evidences,

as even the royal Word of a King cannot outweigh.

THAT very Year in which the general Attack was to have been made on his Dominions, *Austria* and *Saxony* had not in *Germany* 100,000 men, and those dispersed ; and certainly their Dominions require little less in Times of the profoundest Peace. *Russia* had not 20,000 within an hundred leagues of his Territories, and those too mustered to fulfil its Engagements with *England* : But the Prince who thus trembled for his Throne, had daily increased his forces since the last Peace, and had then actually 180,000 of the best disciplined Troops in *Europe*, encamped round his Capital, and ready to march at a Day's Warning ; a Number so far from proportioned to the Extent of his

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his Dominions, that were they to remain inactive, his whole Revenues could not long support them ; nor his whole territories supply with Recruits which natural death would make necessary, without being depopulated in the Course of a no very long period.

THE hostile manner in which he entered *Saxony* (the most Protestant Country of all *Germany*) ; his seizing upon that whole Country, its Revenues, and its Troops, notwithstanding the Offer of a Neutrality, which at first he seemed only to desire, together with all reasonable Security for his free Passage (which, by the bye, did not appear so absolutely necessary to the Possessors of *Silesia*) : These, and many other as extraordinary Proceedings, may then, I say, strike us in a different
Light.

Light. What shall we say of his forcing that unhappy People, without Respect to Persons or Ranks, to serve in his Armies against their Sovereign, their Friends, and Allies? What shall we say of the unprecedentedly cruel Methods of driving them into this cruel Servitude, and detaining them there? Of before unheard of Exactions, as arbitrarily levied? Of merchants, Books and Papers seized, and themselves cast into Dungeons, to squeeze the last Penny from them? Will the giving up *Bamberg* to the Mercy of his licentious Soldiers, for two successive Days, at stated Hours, with all the Calmness of the most bloody Tyrant, upon the most frivolous Pretext, then appear justifiable? Or rather will it not appear an Act of the most deliberate Barbarity ever exercised amongst Christians? Shall we then think the un-

authorized Excesses of a few *Cossacks*, in a few Villages (some of whom we know to have been rigorously punished for it), outweigh the successive and more cruel, as well as more extensive, Devastations of so many Provinces by royal Command? The unhappy Necessities of War, might perhaps have justified the Governors of *Dresden* and *Torgau*, determined to defend their Posts to the last, in burning the Suburbs of those Towns; but within few Hours after those noble Feats, they quietly surrendered to the first Summons. Awakened from our present Prejudices, while we continue to admire the extensive Genius of the great General, we may perhaps find sufficient Reason to diminish our Opinion of the Man; and the mean Revenge he took on the Houses of Count *Brühl*, may possibly make us question whether

whether he even possesses all the Qualities of a Hero. Such are the Sentiments with Regard to that Monarch's Conduct, which perhaps even his most sanguine Admirers will scarce defend themselves from, as soon as he shall again become the Ally of *France*, and consequently our Enemy.

By what I have said, my Readers will possibly pronounce me an open and declared Enemy to our present Measures and Alliances. But I must tell them, that though I do not doubt the Prudence of the Motives which induced our Rulers to enter into this Connection with *Prussia*, I cannot think it necessary to extol his every Action at the Expence of Truth and Justice; much less can I think it incumbent on us to sacrifice Conquests, which

which our own Abilities properly exerted, have won us, in Compliance with the Ambition or Obstinacy of a Prince, who must necessarily in a few Years return to the Alliance of our greatest enemy.

I am indeed persuaded that the Circumstances of our Affairs at that Time required our accepting of that Alliance, which neither the general Biass of our Interest, nor perhaps even Choice made our Ministry inclined to. It should seem at least, their Sentiments were different, when a little before a strict Alliance was renewed at *Hanover* with *Austria* and *Russia*, presumptively at least against that very King of *Prussia*; and by which a Body of *Russians*, (whose Introduction into *Germany* we have since

so

so much exclaimed against) were actually pre-engaged in our Service. Without pretending to be in the Secret, one may at least venture to form some Conjectures on the Motives, which then induced the two Powers to adopt a System so contrary to their former alliances.

The King of *Prussia* was at that Time at the Head of the most formidable and best disciplined Army, conducted by the most experienced Generals then in *Europe*, himself the greatest General of them all. His enemies were comparatively unprepared. Elated with the Prospect of the Success such an Army might promise him, proportionable Funds secured, alone wanting to secure his Superiority. Should *Eng-*
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land support *Austria*, (as it certainly would have done, had he continued in the Alliance of *France*) he knew the Queen's vast Dominions, roused by *British* Gold, would sooner or later supply her with Forces to oppose his Progress, whilst his own would dwindle away for want of that main Spring of War. *Hanover* too lying so near his Territories might prove a dangerous Curb to his Conquests in *Bohemia*, the *Russians* well paid, would be an endless, and perhaps then active Enemy. *France* lay at a vast Distance. Rapidity was the only Security for his Conquests. Such were probably, or some at least of the prudent Motives, which induced that Politick Monarch so unexpectedly to offer us his Alliance.

Hanover

Hanover was threatened with an Invasion in Consequence of our Quarrels with *France*; Justice required of us not to suffer it to be made the Victim of a War, which solely belonged to *England*. *Prussia*, as a Neighbour, was a dangerous Enemy, and if successful elsewhere, (of which he no doubt took some Pains to evince the Probability) might be a no less powerful Support: These perhaps, and many other Considerations, made it prudent to accept the profered Friendship of a Prince, who must otherwise be an Enemy much to be dreaded. We ourselves were at that shameful Period seized with such a Panick, as required the Support (however imaginary) of a foreign Alliance.

Circumstances are now once more,

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happily changed, and it is incumbent on our Ministers to consider a-new, whether the Prosecution of the War in Consequence of that Alliance (farther than a just Fidelity requires, which should ever be inviolable) may not prove more prejudicial than conducive to the Interest of this Nation. It is said (how true I know not) that whilst our Affairs were still in a languishing Posture, a Convention was entered into with *Prussia*, not to make peace without his absolute Consent and Concurrence. It was likewise added, that that Monarch at first positively refused to bind himself down to such Articles with a People, whose real Force was to be exerted on an Element on which he could neither assist, nor be assisted by them; but that after repeated instances £670,000 had prevailed

vailed over those Scruples. Such a Report seems to have been meant to insinuate to the Publick, that we have formally bound ourselves to be dependent on the Caprices or Fortunes of that Prince. It is usual with confederate Princes at War to oblige themselves reciprocally not to treat with the Enemy clandestinely or separately, but to offer Peace conjointly, and support as much as may be each others Claims. Without such an Agreement no Confidence could ever subsist amongst Allies : But it never can be supposed that the one should be under an Obligation of sacrificing at a Treaty, the Conquests it may have made, to repair the Losses of the other ; much less can it be expected, when they are chiefly supposed to act on different Elements. No one certainly

can suspect the great Minister, who now sits at the Helm, capable of subjecting us without Necessity to any unusual Clogs with a new, and I think I may say, temporary Ally, whose Policy he is too well acquainted with, to imagine him romantick enough to refuse an advantageous Offer, to repair any Losses we might have sustained, where his Arms could be of no Assistance to us. As it is moreover highly probable, that the next War will see him again united to his old and natural Ally, would it not be a still greater Folly in us to enlarge or indemnify his Territories at the Expence of our own? We have hitherto faithfully adhered to all the Engagements we can with Propriety be supposed to have entered into, by generously granting him the largest Subsidy, I believe,

believe, ever paid to any foreign Prince, and recently, by a considerable Reinforcement of Men, even at the Risk of our Army, for whose Safety, when thus weakened, we have no other Dependance than the superior Capacity of its Leader, and the uncommon Pusillanimity of the *French*. Whatever Disasters may yet befall him, our powerful Interposition at a Treaty will, no doubt, be able to oblige his enemies, already tired with a ruinous War, to consent to reasonable Terms: More we should not do, nor he expect.

There is one Method, however, which occurs to me (though such only as are long conversant in the Affairs of *Europe*, can with Authority decide in such Matters) which might perhaps conciliate

conciliate our Engagements with that Prince, both with our present and future Interests. As numberless Schemes and Proposals are daily offered to the Publick for a future Peace, this perhaps may be suffer'd at least to pass in the Crowd.

As to what Part of our *American* or *West-Indian* Conquests it behoves us to retain, or what a prudent Moderation should incline us to restore, I think has already been discussed with so much Elegance and Justness, by the Author of a late sensible *Letter to two Great Men*, that I shall not venture to say any Thing on that Head. What I would suggest, is, that something still greater than the Preservation of our Ally from impending ruin, might perhaps be demanded,

as the Price of what we shall think proper to restore.

Germany is on the Continent the only Power capable of restraining and keeping in awe the Ambition of *France*, and set Bounds to that Thirst of Conquest, which has and will always actuate, more or less, the absolute Sovereigns of so rich and powerful a Monarchy, whose numerous Nobility knows no other System of Life than that of War. Whenever there is any Rivality in *Germany*, as all are too poor to carry on a War with their own Revenues, the one will always adhere to *England*, whose Interest in that Case is to assist the strongest; and the other of course seek Support from *France*, whose invariable Policy it has always been, not so much to relieve

lieve one, as underhand to destroy both. Experience has shewn us, that unless counter-balanced at vast Expence of *British* Treasure and Blood, *France*, when joined even by a small Part of *Germany*, is an over-match for the rest. The present Circumstances, occasioned only by an unparalleled Depravation of Government, cannot invalidate a general Truth, which so many Facts and Ages have established.

The greatest Service we then can render to *Europe* and ourselves, would be to find some Method of terminating those Jealousies and Contentions which have always subsisted between the rival Powers of that *Empire*, by making it the most immediate and present Interest of all to check for the Future the overgrown

grown Power of *France*, which has hitherto been the only Gainer by their Disputes. If this too could be the Means of bringing this sanguinary War to a speedier Conclusion, it would still be more worthy of the humane Policy of *Great Britain*.

To compass this great End, I should propose that in Exchange for *Silesia*, the great Object of the Queen of *Hungary's* Views, which the King of *Prussia* should cede with all his Claims and Pretensions to her, together with some reasonable Indemnification which can scarcely be refused to *Saxony*, the Empress Queen should make over to him all her Possessions in the *Netherlands*; Territories fully equal in value. This Exchange will no doubt at first Sight ap-

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pear strange, and perhaps not practicable; but if duly considered, it might not be so difficult to bring about, if *Great Britain*, in her present triumphant Situation, should seriously make it a Point.

Flanders, though in itself so rich a Country, has hitherto, I believe, if Accompts were fairly stated, been of little or no Advantage to the *Austrian* Family. Disjointed by so great a Distance from the larger and more valuable Dominions of that House, it has served only to embroil it in unequal Contests with *France*, and has often endangered its total Ruin. With a View of making, if not an immediate, at least a future Conquest of those long'd-for Provinces it was, that *France* so eagerly joined

joined, to dismember the Dominions of the present Queen of *Hungary*, and by no means out of pure Friendship to the Elector of *Bavaria*; and for this End she knows they will again, after some Years of Peace, encourage the King of *Prussia* to attack her. Nay, if in Consequence of the present System of Alliance, they should take her Part in another War, she knows she must still, by new Cessions there, purchase their faithless Amity.

Silesia extends the whole Length of *Bobemia* and *Moravia*, and joins on to *Hungary*, and with the other *Austrian* Dominions would form one compact and extensive Kingdom, secured from the Enterprizes of her present Competitor, whose Attention would be drawn

elfewhere. That Princess would soon
 find herself more powerful by the Possession of such well-united Territories, undisturbed by Inroads and Hostilities, than by richer scattered Provinces, on all Sides claimed and envied by powerful Neighbours. On the other Hand, her most sanguine Expectations so often disappointed in the present War, during which the *Prussian* Monarch, notwithstanding repeated Defeats, has yet drawn such Resources from his own superiour Genius, and the Valour and Confidence of his Troops, as ever to keep his Victors in awe, and leave the Fate of *Silesia* as yet far from decided; should have by this Time convinced the Empress Queen, that the Cession of a distant, and to her unprofitable Territory, is perhaps yet the cheapest Rate at which she

she can purchase that valuable Province.
 Nay, it is probable she is already satisfied of the superior Value of *Silesia* to her; if, as it is confidently reported, she has already agreed to yield a considerable Part of *Flanders* to her old, and as long as she retains any of it, still secret Enemy, to procure their precarious Assistance towards re-conquering *Silesia*. These, or such like Arguments, properly and forcibly urged, the already experienced Uncertainty of the Events of War against a daring and undismayed Antagonist; her Inability, from the distressed State of her Finances, of protracting it, should her first Efforts in an ensuing Campaign, be baffled or delayed. These, I say, may reasonably be supposed to carry sufficient Weight with them, to make that Princess hearken
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to such Overtures, which tend to put her in Possession of her greatest and favourite Object, notwithstanding any Machinations of *France* to the contrary; and there are perhaps some as cogent Reasons to incline the King of *Prussia* not to refuse those Conditions.

Though he has hitherto defended himself beyond Belief, he must no doubt be sensible that the Loss of most of his best Generals and Veteran Soldiers, the utter Impracticability of recruiting his Armies in Countries already almost entirely depopulated, the small Hopes left of purchasing the Neutrality or Inactivity of *Russia*, render his Situation every Day more and more desperate, since even Victories over such numerous and formidable Armies, must, in a short Time,

Time, cut off all further Resources with the Men he loses in acquiring them. The Recovery even of *Saxony* (should he be able to compass it) can give him but slight Hopes, as it is much to be questioned whether the Possession of it during the Winter, will sufficiently make him amends, for the many Thousands he has lost in the Undertaking. Such being the present untoward Situation of his Affairs, it is probable he will not be so deaf to all Accommodation, as to refuse, in Compensation for the precarious and disputed Possessions of *Silesia*, the peaceable Surrender of one of the finest Countries in *Europe*; populous, rich and fruitful, and on all Sides defended by Fortifications of great Strength; a Country which must secure to him for ever so powerful and beneficial an Alliance

Alliance as that of *Great Britain*, which, by its Proximity, will ever be at Hand to share in its Defence. *Austria* even, now his implacable Enemy, would then probably be reckoned amongst his Allies. *Flanders* once alienated, that Family could have no Views nor Hopes of recovering it, and having no other Subject of Contention with him, (for *Brandenburgh* will not excite much Envy) they would readily seize any Opportunity of recovering from *France* those fine Provinces, which it has gradually extorted from them. The *Prussian* Monarch will, no doubt, view that Country in a very different Light, from what it appears at *Vienna*, where the Accompt of Debtor and Creditor will certainly shew the Possession more honourable than advantageous. *Halberstadt,*

Stadt, Halle, La Marcke and Cleves, form a Chain which easily connects it with his *German* Dominions, and renders the Inspection and Defence of it easy. Its singular natural Riches and Advantages, called forth and improved under the Influence of so vigilant and penetrating a Prince, would in a short time, render it, no doubt, as well the most opulent, as the most powerful State of its Extent in *Europe*.

As to the *Flemings* themselves, provided they were sufficiently secured in their ancient Privileges, and established Religion, to which they have ever been zealously attached, there is little doubt but they would think themselves happy in a change of Masters, which would give them the Hopes of seeing their

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Prince

Prince often residing amongst them, and above all afford them a reasonable Prospect of reviving in some Degree their decayed Trade, the chief Profits of which have been so long reaped by the *Dutch*.

It is easily foreseen indeed, that the strongest and most vigorous Opposition will be made to this Project by *France* and *Holland*, the former of which would thus see a new and formidable Mound thrown up against its ambitious Views and Projects on that Side, and the latter a considerable Branch of its present Trade once more returned into its old and proper Channel. But if we continue to preserve the great Advantages we have so gloriously gained, and the Consent of the other two Powers is obtained,

tained, *France* deserted by *Austria*, in its present low Situation, would be under Necessity of re-purchasing, how unwillingly soever, some Part of the valuable Conquests we have made on it by at least a temporary acquiescence; and I think there is little Reason to apprehend that the King of *Prussia* would not be able to maintain the Possession once acquired, divided, weak, and pusillanimous as the *Dutch* now are; their Opposition unsupported by a Land Army, against the united Resolves of *England*, *Hanover*, *Prussia* and *Austria*, would be of little Importance. The same Reasons which would make this Exchange appear so dreadful to the *French*, are of course evident Proofs of the real Advantages that would accrue to *England*, from it. Besides the ge-

neral Benefit of establishing a sufficient Ballance against that Power on the Continent, this Nation would have a particular Interest in thus drawing its Attention from Naval Affairs to the Defence of its own Frontiers.

SOME Objections, with Regard to our Interests as a commercial Nation, I am sensible will be started against this Project: The two only material ones which occur to me, I shall here briefly endeavour to refute.

First, It will be objected, that by introducing such a Prince as the King of *Prussia*, ambitious, enterprizing, and active, into *Flanders*, a Country so well calculated for Trade, we shall set up a new Rival in Commerce, more particularly

cularly if he should revive the Project of an *East-India* Company at *Ostend*, as his endeavouring it even at *Embden*, sufficiently shews he wanted.

To this I shall answer, that by the same Treaty which puts him in Possession of the *Netherlands*, we may stipulate in exprefs Terms, that no Ship from any of its Ports shall ever be permitted to trade into that Part of the World; and though much Fidelity to Treaties is not to be expected from Princes, yet the Dread of losing our Support and Alliance, and the sure Interposition of the concurrent Interests of all the trading Nations, will be sufficient Securities for the Observance of this Article. If it is apprehended that *Flanders* may still carry on an evasive Trade with

with the *East-Indies*, by the means of the already erected Company of *Embden*; why should not *East Friezland* be ceded by the same Treaty to *Hanover*, which has already Pretensions to it? or may it not at least be included with *Ostend* in the Prohibition? Thus excluded from all foreign Branches of Trade, *Flanders* would possess no other Commerce than that which arises from its own Products: These are at present either exported into *France*, or into other Parts of *Europe*, through *Holland*, which reaps the chief Benefit of this Trade. The Commerce of our good and faithful Allies the *Dutch* (whose pretended Friendship, by the by, has perhaps been no less detrimental to *England*, than the open Enmity of *France*) will indeed receive some Detriment

triment by this Scheme: But it is to be hoped their Behaviour has by this Time so well opened our Eyes, as to warn us for the future not to sacrifice our own Advantages to their Emoluments; and I believe, it will be easily granted that the same Trade, divided betwixt two distinct People of different Interests, as the *Dutch* and *Flemings* will then be, is likely to be less prejudicial to us, than when wholly usurped by one Nation, whose Commerce is certainly already more extensive than is suitable to our Interests.

Secondly. It will be objected that the King of *Prussia*, once Master of *Flanders*, and equally superior to others in Politicks, as in every other Thing, may be inclined rather to enlarge his Dominions,

nions, by seizing upon *Holland* weak and defenceless, than by struggling with Difficulty against the Power of *France*, with the Prospect of much smaller Acquisitions; and that if once become Master of the *United Provinces*, and their immense Trade and Riches, which he would apply in a very different Manner from what they now do, he might render himself an over-match even for the united naval Forces of *England* and *France*.

To this it may be replied, that *France*, as well as *Holland*, ever watchful of all his Motions, will not fail to exert its whole Power in defence of that Republick, which, if subdued and re-united to *Flanders* and his other Dominions, under such a Prince, would bid fair

fair to shake the Monarchy to its very Foundations. We too should take an equal Alarm at the very Appearance of such an Attempt ; and one must indeed suppose him invincible to imagine he could ever compass so arduous an Undertaking in direct Opposition to three such formidable Powers.

These are the two principal Objections with respect to our commercial Interests, which would probably be raised against such a Scheme ; and I should think these exclusive even of many other Arguments sufficient to obviate them.

Great Britain, triumphant and successful as she has of late been, unrivalled Mistress of the Seas, and by her Power and Influence, holding in her Hands

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the Ballance of *Europe* on the Continent, cannot surely make a nobler use of the Blessings which Providence has heaped upon her, than by sacrificing some Part of her Conquests to purchase for all *Europe* a Security and Tranquility, which it has long fought for, and which, should a *Frederick* start up in *France*, would still be as precarious as ever. Can this be more effectually done than by forming such a Barrier quite round that powerful Kingdom, as may henceforward be a secure and sufficient Curb to that Lust of Power, and Dominion, which has for some Ages threatened the Liberties of all *Europe*.

F I N I S.